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Abstract Recently there has been an increased attention towards the ex-post evalua-
tion of competition policy enforcement decisions and in particular merger decisions.
In this paper we study the effects of two mobile telecommunication mergers on prices.
We apply a standard difference-in-differences approach which is widely used in the lit-
erature on ex-post evaluation of mergers. For the Austrian T-Mobile/tele.ring merger,
we conclude that after the acquisition (for which remedies were imposed) prices in
Austria did not increase relative to the considered control countries. For the Dutch
T-Mobile/Orange merger, we observe an increase in the mobile tariff prices in the
Netherlands in the analysed period, relative to the control countries. We cannot firmly
establish whether this price increase was exclusively caused by the T-Mobile/Orange
merger or in part by possible price effects brought about by the KPN/Telfort merger
consummated two years earlier in the Netherlands. However, we believe that such
price increase could be linked to the structural changes brought by both KPN/Telfort
and T-Mobile/Orange mergers together.
This paper is based on the report “Ex-post evaluation analysis of two mobile telecom mergers:
T-Mobile/tele.ring in Austria and T-Mobile/Orange in the Netherlands” available at https://ec.europa.eu/
competition/publications/reports/kd0215836enn.pdf. The views expressed in this article are personal and
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1 Introduction
Companies use mergers to combine forces in order to expand markets, develop new
products more efficiently or reduce production or distribution costs. However, some
mergers may reduce competition as well which may harm consumers through higher
prices, reduced choice or less innovation and quality. The objective of merger control
is to ensure that notified mergers are only cleared if they are not expected to entail
significant anticompetitive effects on parameters like price, quality, innovation and
variety. While the merger control is usually based upon expectations and hypothe-
ses, ex-post evaluation can shed light on the actual procompetitive or anticompetitive
effects of consummated mergers.
Recently, increased attention is being paid to ex-post evaluation of competition
policy enforcement decisions, and in particular merger decisions. In the United States,
there is already an established and voluminous body of studies that covers several
industries and several types of decisions (Kwoka 2013).
In this paper, we empirically examine the effects on retail prices of two mergers in
the mobile telecommunication industry:
• T-Mobile-tele.ring merger in Austria, approved with remedies1 in April 2006.2
• T-Mobile-Orange merger in the Netherlands, approved without remedies in August
2007.3
This paper hence contributes to a limited, but growing, number of ex-post assess-
ments in Europe (Mariuzzo et al. 2016) and aims at improving our understanding of
consummated mergers.
The mobile telecom industry is an industry of significant interest for merger con-
trol, as the European mobile telecom sector has witnessed several recent mergers
between independent mobile network operators in a number of different national mar-
kets. Mergers in that industry also tend to have long-lasting effects due to very high
entry barriers because of the need to acquire very costly spectrum and to roll out a
mobile network. The mobile telecom industry also presents a number of interesting
specificities (complex tariff offers, non-linear prices) that this study tries to address
and that might also be relevant to other industries.
1 Remedies are modifications to the merger plans that would preserve the competition condition absent the
merger. They can take the form of structural remedies (e.g. divestment of certain activities or a division) or
behavioural remedies (e.g. price regulation or access to certain facilities).
2 The Commission’s case reference is M.3916. Further information is available under http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_3916.
3 The Commission’s case reference is M.4748. Further information is available under http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_4748.
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Mainly due to issues of data availability, this study is limited to the effects of the
mentioned mergers on retail prices. We are aware, however, that a merger may also
affect other market outcomes such as investments and quality.4
Insights of retrospective merger evaluations can contribute to improving the
enforcement practice of competition authorities in various ways. Retrospective merger
analysis allows testing the merits of arguments commonly brought forward in past
cases. Ex-post evaluation can also help competition authorities to calibrate the merger
policy by identifying potential systematic biases in merger decisions. For example, in
a recent survey, Kwoka (2013) finds that mergers which are conditionally cleared in
the US often still had significant anti-competitive effects.
This study applies reduced-form econometric methods typically used in the so-
called treatment evaluation literature, which are commonly applied also to the ex-post
assessment of competition policy. Effectively, we compare, both before and after the
merger, the price development of the country in which the respective analysed merger
took place (“affected country”) with a number of countries in which no structural
change took place over the same period (“control countries”). This permits to estimate
the price development that would have been observed in the country of interest absent
the merger and to identify the merger effect. Specifically, we apply a difference-in-
differences (DiD) approach which is widely used in the policy evaluation literature and
for ex-post evaluation of mergers. We also test whether our identifying assumption of
“common trends” in the studied countries is met pre-merger. As in many case studies,
we observe only a single affected country, and overall we have a small sample (in
statistical terms) of control countries. We address this challenge by applying recent
approaches to improve the estimation of standard errors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we give a
short introduction of the context of this study, merger control, the mobile telecommu-
nication sector and the selected cases. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical
approach. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Study Context
2.1 Merger Control
Mergers are an extremely common phenomenon in market economies. For instance,
since 2000 more than 5000 cases were notified to the European Commission (EC) and
many more were notified to national competitions authorities. If merging parties reach a
certain turnover threshold they have to notify their merger (either to national authorities
or to the EC). In a typical EC merger case, after notification, the EC assesses whether
the merger would significantly reduce competition to the detriment of consumers.
The EC’s investigation of the merger effects is divided in two phases, a preliminary
investigation (Phase 1) and in-depth investigation (Phase 2) that may follow. In Phase
4 Mobile internet was in its early stages of development in the period considered in this study, and therefore
network coverage and network performance for mobile data is not particularly relevant. Mobile network
coverage for voice and SMS services would have been an important metric to study. However, network
coverage for voice and SMS was generally high for all the operators considered and there is was no significant
variation over time in the period under analysis.
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1 most mergers are cleared, either unconditionally or subject to remedies. Mergers that
raise concerns are further investigated in Phase 2. In this phase, the merger may be
unconditionally cleared, cleared subject to remedies or prohibited. Of the more than
5000 EC merger cases notified between 2000 and 2016, only about 170 reached Phase
2 of the proceeding.
If two competitors merge the most direct effect is the loss of competition between
the merging firms, which normally triggers the incentive for the merging parties to
raise prices post-merger. Moreover, to the extent prices are strategic complements,
unilateral price increases by the merging parties may be followed by price increases
by the non-merging firms even without coordination (i.e. collusion) among market
players (Ivaldi et al. 2003).
A merger can also entail (consumer) welfare-enhancing effects. This may be the
case if the merger leads to increased efficiency and lower costs (or better quality), and
the benefits are passed through to consumers.
The total effect of a merger depends on the magnitude of anti-competitive effects
and efficiency gains. If the anti-competitive effects are more pronounced than the
efficiency gains, the outcome for consumers deteriorates. This will often lead to higher
prices, compared to the scenario without the merger. If the merging firms can realise
sufficient efficiency gains and the remaining competition is strong enough, a merger
may improve the outcome for consumers.
2.2 Mergers in the Mobile Telecommunication Sector
Table 1 lists the EC merger cases in the mobile telecommunication sector between
2006 and 2016.5 In eight of the ten cases, there was a concentration from four to three
Mobile Network Operators (MNOs).6 Two merger cases were unconditionally cleared,
six were cleared subject to remedies, one was prohibited, and one was withdrawn. From
2012 onwards all merger cases notified to the EC reduced the number of competitors
in the market from four to three, and raised competition concerns such that remedies
where required or the concentration was prohibited (and in one case was withdrawn).
The mobile telecommunication market is an important market with a lot of publicly
available data, but empirical studies, like ours, on the effects of mergers in the telecom-
munications industry have been limited so far. To our knowledge, these include studies
by Csorba and Pápai (2013), Nitsche and Affeldt (2014), Genakos et al. (2015) and
Frontier Economics (2015). While these studies use data on entries of new MNOs and
mergers in several countries to identify the effect that a change in market structure
brings to the mobile telecom industry in general (e.g. new entrants, five-to-four merg-
ers, four-to-three mergers, etc.), we analyse two mergers in two different countries
separately and independently.
5 This table exclusively contains mobile telecom mergers that were assessed by the EC. However, in line
with the applicable rules on jurisdiction, mergers that involve parties which generate a large part of their
revenues in a given member state are typically dealt with by the national competition authorities, as was
the case for the KPN/Telfort merger in the Netherlands also discussed in this report.
6 MNOs need the tangible assets (i.e. hardware for a radio access network), and the intangible assets (i.e.
the license to use certain radio frequencies for mobile telecommunication, called spectrum).
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The T-Mobile/tele.ring merger in Austria was cleared subject to structural remedies
(i.e. divestment of assets) in April 2006 after an in-depth investigation by the EC.
At the time of the merger there were five mobile network operators (MNOs) active
on the Austrian market: Mobilkom Austria (the incumbent with a market share of
around 40%); T-Mobile (24%); Orange (20%); tele.ring (12%) and Hutchison 3G (or
H3G, with a market share of 3%, having just entered the market in 2003). The EC’s
investigation concluded that tele.ring was the most aggressive player in the mobile
market and exerted competitive pressure especially on T-Mobile and Mobilkom. The
proposed transaction raised serious competition concerns and was only approved after
T-Mobile offered a package of remedies which consisted of the transfer of parts of
tele.ring’s spectrum and mobile telecommunication sites to H3G and Orange.
The T-Mobile/Orange merger in the Netherlands was cleared without remedies by
the EC in August 2007. Prior to the T-Mobile/Orange merger, KPN was the market
leader with a retail market share in terms of subscribers of roughly 39%. Other MNOs
active in the mobile telecommunications market were Vodafone with 21% subscriber
market share, T-Mobile (14% subscriber market share), and Orange (12%). With the
acquisition of Orange, T-Mobile became the second largest MNO in the Netherlands
with a market share exceeding 25%. Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNO)7
have a combined subscriber market share of around 15%.
Compared to many other mobile telecommunication markets in Europe, there was
a fast-growing presence of the MVNO segment in the Dutch retail mobile telecom
market. This is reflected in the EC’s clearance decision of the T-Mobile/Orange merger
that points to the strong presence of the MVNOs as one of the factors countervailing
the possible loss of competition from the reduction in the number of MNOs in the
Netherlands’ mobile telecom market.
One important specificity of the Dutch case study is that the T-Mobile/Orange
merger was preceded by another merger between KPN and the by then fifth-largest
MNO Telfort, which was unconditionally cleared in August 2005 by the Dutch com-
petition authority.
3 Data and Empirical Approach
3.1 Data
A specific challenge of estimating merger effects in the mobile telecom industry relates
to the fact that consumers generally purchase a bundle of mobile telecommunications
services. Subscribers may inter alia place mobile calls, send text messages (SMS)
and may also use mobile data services. A mobile tariff is usually characterized by the
amount of mobile services (voice calls, SMS, mobile data) included in the monthly fee,
the unit prices for the different “out of bundle” mobile services, as well as further fees
such as set-up fees and connection fees. The total expenditure of a subscriber for mobile
7 Compared to MNOs, MVNOs do not own the essential facilities to run a mobile network. In contrast,
MVNOs lease the access to the network of one of the MNOs. MNOs normally are not obliged to grant
access to their network, access is usually granted on commercial basis and it is not regulated.
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services is then determined based on the usage and on the chosen tariff plan. Given these
specificities, one of the challenges in analyzing the mobile telecommunications market
is to derive a one-dimensional price index to measure the “price level”. In this study,
we derive the price index by measuring the monthly expenditure of representative
consumers for which we collected a representative usage pattern. The effect of the
merger is then estimated on this monthly expenditure. We refer to this measure as
“price”. For the computation of the price, we focus on active tariffs that are offered
by MNOs at a given moment in time and exclude tariffs that cannot be selected by
new customers any more.8 We consider the former as the relevant tariffs because
competition in the telecom market focuses on the tariffs available at any given point in
time, and prices are mostly adjusted by introducing new tariffs, rather than changing
the price of existing or legacy tariffs. Therefore, possible price effects of a merger
can be observed more clearly when focusing on offered tariffs. This approach is also
followed by other econometric studies of the mobile telecom sector such as Genakos
et al. (2015) and Csorbaet al. (2015).
Another characteristic of the mobile telecom industry is price discrimination
through nonlinear tariff plans. That is, operators typically offer quantity discounts
by means of tariffs with more included minutes, SMS and mobile data and a higher
absolute price but a lower unit price for the different components than bundles with
fewer included units. Consumers with different usage characteristics self-select into
their preferred tariff plan. For this reason, we estimate the merger effects separately
for three representative consumer types by usage patterns (i.e. consumers with low,
mid and high usage).
We collected detailed country level tariff data for the periods both before and after
the merger. We use three different sources for tariff data. A first dataset covering the
tariffs of the largest two operators in fourteen European countries (AT, BE, CH, CZ,
DE, DK, FI, FR, HU, IT, NL, SE, PT, UK) on a quarterly basis between 2004 and 2010
was obtained from the data provider Teligen. For both the Netherlands and Austria, a
richer set of data was available. In our analysis we combined those datasets with the
Teligen data including in the latter only the set of countries representing the control
group.9,10 In this respect, we consider the prices of the largest two operators as a valid
proxy for the development of the market price in the control group of countries. For
the Netherlands, the richer set of data was obtained from the provider Telecompaper
that covers tariffs of all operators in the Netherlands on a quarterly basis between
2004 and 2010. For Austria, the richer set of data was obtained from the Austrian
chamber of labour (Arbeiterkammer), and covers the tariffs of all Austrian operators
on a quarterly basis between 2004 and 2010.
The final datasets cover in each quarter the full range of retail tariff plans available
to new customers and contain all the tariff characteristics required to calculate the price
8 Tariffs often have minimum contract duration and a significant number of customers are typically sub-
scribed to tariffs that are not offered to new customers any more.
9 However, using the Teligen data with only the two largest operators for Austria and the Netherlands would
not materially change the results.
10 Austria and the Netherlands are not included in the control group of one another.
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for each tariff given a certain usage pattern (number of voice minutes and SMS).11
All datasets cover pre-paid as well as post-paid tariffs. MNOs often offer very low
and subsidized handset prices and expect to recoup those initial handset subsidies via
the monthly payments of the subscribers. Handset subsidies, if part of the tariff, are
not separately identified in the available datasets. This may have an impact on the
price effects that we estimate, especially if handset subsidies are also affected by the
mergers we study. To control for this possibility, we estimate a robustness test of our
model including only pre-paid tariffs, as those tariffs are generally less affected by
handset subsidies.
To approximate the usage of the representative consumer, we collected the average
mobile telecommunications usage in each country, obtained from publicly avail-
able sources (e.g. websites of the relevant national regulatory authorities).12 We use
country-specific consumption bundles in order to better reflect the countries’ speci-
ficities and the significant differences across consumption preferences and resulting
price patterns. The average voice and SMS usage for the fourteen countries is depicted
in Table 2.
The countries’ average usage baskets (minutes and SMS) was kept constant over
the period considered in the analysis to prevent changes in the consumption pattern
from influencing the tariffs’ price series. This allows us to clearly separate price effects
(changes in the tariffs offered) from quantity effects (changes in usage). We therefore
consider this approach as more appropriate than an approach where usage changes
over time. For the analysis of the Austrian merger, we use for each country in the
analysis the 2006 consumption levels while for the Dutch merger we use 2007 levels
(i.e. the years of the respective mergers under analysis).
To analyse the effects in different market segments and also to cover a larger range
of tariffs, we construct a High and a Low usage basket based on the average usage of
Table 2. The factors applied to rescale the average (Mid) usage basket are taken from
the OECD’s study on mobile tariffs (OECD 2006) and are depicted in Table 3.
11 Our calculation follows a similar methodology as OECD (2006). The included tariff characteristics are:
activation charge/connection fee (spread over 24 months); monthly fixed fee; minimum monthly fee; number
of included minutes/SMS and; price per out of bundle minute/SMS—by target network and peak/off-peak
time. Mobile data services were not relevant in the studied period.
The assumed average call duration is 2 min. The off-net calls are split equally among the other MNOs
active in the country. The shares of peak and off-peak (i.e. evenings and weekends) calls are 50%. The
peak/off-peak and on-net/off-net split does not materially affect the prices as for most tariffs, the voice
prices do not depend on time (peak/off-peak) and destination network (on-net/off-net).
To improve the comparison across countries, we applied the following adjustments: deducting applicable
value added taxes from the tariff price series because in some countries the VAT changed during the
period of the analysis; incorporating inflation by computing real prices using the Harmonised Indices of
Consumer Prices (HIPC); converting the price from local currencies into EURO, for non-Euro countries
(Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Sweden and the UK) based on a constant nominal average exchange
rate over the years 2004–2009 in order to limit the impact that fluctuations of the exchange rate may have
on the countries’ price series.
12 The average usage also reflects the usage of customers on legacy tariffs. Given that there is a trend of
falling prices, the average usage per subscriber on available tariffs (as opposed to legacy tariffs) may be
somewhat higher than that of customers on legacy tariffs. However, we account for this possibility by also
estimating the price effects for the high usage basket, which significantly exceeds the average usage.
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Table 3 Factors for Low and High usage basket based on OECD Baskets
Basket Minutes factor SMS factor
Low 0.46 0.66
Mid 1 1
High 2.15 1.1
We intend to capture the evolution of the prices of those tariffs that are likely
to be purchased by an average consumer whose consumption pattern resembles the
usage baskets described above. To this end, for each usage basket we include only
the prices of the four cheapest tariffs per operator in our estimation. We could have
considered a smaller number of tariffs (i.e. the cheapest tariff available given the
consumption pattern). However, we believe that including the four cheapest tariffs has
some advantages. First, it can reflect a higher degree of heterogeneity across the users
for each usage basket. Second, users may not know their exact usage in advance and
may not choose the tariff which is the cheapest from an ex-post perspective. Third,
this approach averages out smaller measurement errors of tariffs or outliers due to
specific tariff plans targeted to specific customer segments (e.g. a family tariff plan).
Nevertheless, as a robustness check, we also focus on the two cheapest tariffs only.
Table 4 shows summary statistics for Austria, the Netherlands and the respective
control groups separately for the pre-merger and the post-merger period. In the period
considered, prices dropped for Austria and the Netherlands as well as for the control
group. This holds true for all three baskets. Mobile termination rates (MTRs),13 an
important cost driver, were also reduced within this time frame.
Figure 1 shows the average prices of the four cheapest tariffs of all MNOs in the
dataset for the Mid basket in the affected countries (Austria and the Netherlands)
and in the twelve countries which potentially serve as control group. All countries
experience a downward trend in the mobile telecom price for the Mid consumption
basket. However, some countries experienced a faster reduction in prices than others.
In order to control for market developments not associated with the mergers, we
included the control variables mobile termination rates and GDP growth. Since MTRs
are due for each call to other mobile networks (off-net), they can be considered as
a proxy for marginal costs of voice calls. The growth of gross domestic product per
capita (GDP) is included as a proxy for changes in demand conditions. In order to
control for further unobservable factors affecting the price series, we include in the
analysis quarterly and country-MNO fixed effects.14
13 Mobile termination rates are fees paid by MNOs to competitors for calls which terminate on the latters’
networks. The rationale of the MTRs is to compensate the operators for the network costs associated with
incoming calls.
14 The country-MNO fixed effects allows for the possibility that the pricing of the same operator is affected
by different fixed effects in different countries.
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics Austria versus control group
Austria Control countries
N Mean SD N Mean SD
Panel a: Austria
Pre-merger
Low Price Basket 160 18.08 5.31 703 16.09 6.02
Mid Price Basket 160 26.26 5.59 703 26.50 8.24
High Price Basket 160 39.21 8.43 703 44.98 13.66
MTR 160 0.13 0.01 703 0.14 0.04
GDP growth 160 0.01 0.00 703 0.01 0.01
Post-merger
Low Price Basket 160 10.63 4.42 704 12.27 5.57
Mid Price Basket 160 16.43 5.35 704 19.44 7.75
High Price Basket 160 25.24 7.64 704 32.38 12.65
MTR 160 0.08 0.01 704 0.09 0.02
GDP growth 160 0.01 0.00 704 0.00 0.01
Netherlands Control countries
N Mean SD N Mean SD
Panel b: the Netherlands
Pre-merger
Low price basket 64 13.60 2.64 384 13.15 5.15
Mid price basket 64 20.86 4.00 384 21.51 7.47
High price basket 64 29.83 3.91 384 35.92 12.35
MTR 64 0.11 0.00 384 0.10 0.02
GDP growth 64 0.01 0.01 384 0.01 0.01
Post-merger
Low price basket 104 12.98 2.96 766 11.95 5.77
Mid price basket 104 20.05 3.94 766 18.37 7.17
High price basket 104 28.23 3.24 766 29.94 11.56
MTR 104 0.09 0.01 766 0.08 0.02
GDP growth 104 0.00 0.01 766 −0.01 0.01
3.2 Empirical Approach
In this study, we applied the difference-in-differences approach. This approach, which
goes back to Ashenfelter (1978) and Ashenfelter and Card (1985), has been widely
applied in the economic literature on program evaluation for the estimation of treatment
effects (see for example the review by Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). While this
approach has traditionally been applied in labour and development economics, in
more recent years it found application also in industrial economics, and in particular
for the ex-post evaluation of mergers (see for example Focarelli and Panetta 2003;
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Fig. 1 Countries’ price series from 2004 to 2009 (Mid basket)
Ashenfelter and Hosken 2008; Aguzzoni et al. 2011; Choné and Linnemer 2012;
Ashenfelter et al. 2013).
In its simplest application, the DiD approach is based on the assumption that the
price change over time observed in the control group approximates the price change
that would have occurred in Austria and the Netherlands (treated countries) absent
the respective mergers. The underlying rationale of this approach is that unobserved
effects, like technological developments, have a similar impact both on the control
group and on the treatment group. The DiD approach can therefore be applied if the
control group satisfies two requirements: first, it is affected by similar unobserved
factors as the treated country (“common trends”) and second, it is not affected by the
studied merger (“no spillover effects”).
The merger effect is identified by comparing the average (across group) differences
in prices before and after the merger. We estimate for each usage level (Low, Mid and
High) the following fixed effects model at the tariff level:
ln(p j,i,t,k) = γshort Dshorti,t +γmedium Dmediumi,t + δ1 G D P growthi,t+δ2ln(MT Ri,t )
+ τt + ci,k + ε j,i,t,k (1)
where ln(p j,i,t,k) is the natural logarithm of the real price of tariff j in country i at
quarter t offered by MNO k, τt is a time fixed effect for quarter t , ci,k is a fixed effect
for country i and MNO k, Dshorti,t and D
medium
i,t are dummies which take the value 1
for all tariffs in the treated countries (i.e. Austria or the Netherlands) in the first and
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second year after the merger, respectively, and ε j,i,t,k is an idiosyncratic error term.15
Our analysis covers up to eight quarters before and eight quarters after the merger, and
we exclude the quarter in which the merger took place. The coefficients of interest are
γshort and γmedium , which can be interpreted as the average merger effect in the first
and second years, respectively, following the merger.
Difference-in-differences estimators are unbiased if the average outcomes of the
treated and control groups would follow the same parallel trend over time. We test
whether the pre-merger trend of the affected countries is similar to the average trend of
the control countries. A similar pre-merger trend may thus suggest that the estimated
price effects are reliable (Angrist and Pischke 2008).
We carry out a formal test of the common trend hypothesis. To perform this test
we first estimate the deviation of the treated country’s price from the average price of
the control countries in each quarter. Then, the test assesses whether the deviations of
the treated country’s price in the pre-merger period follow a different trend than the
average price of the control countries.16
When the test fails, country specific linear trends can be included in the DiD model.
Under this model specification the identification of the effect relies on the assumption
that absent the merger the (ln of the) price in the treated country would have followed
the same pre-existing (linear) trend that characterized the pre-merger period (after
controlling for the other time varying explanatory variables and for the common time
effect). So one assumes that the diverging trends will continue in the post-intervention
periods between the treatment and control groups.
In the DiD specification with country-specific trends we follow an approach similar
to Wolfers (2006). Formally, we estimate the following specification (“Trend specifi-
cation”):
ln(p j,i,t,k) = γt Di,t + ∂i t + δ1 G D P growthi,t + δ2ln(MT Ri,t ) + τt
+ ci,k + ε j,i,t,k (2)
here, ∂i t represents the country-specific linear trends. We estimate the effect of the
merger using the dummies Di,t which take the value 1 for country i and each quarter
t after the merger. Hence, in our analyses there are eight dummies. The coefficients γt
capture for each quarter the estimated effect of the merger relative to the counterfactual.
We then compute the average effect of the merger in the short term (first year) and in
the medium term (second year) by taking the average of, respectively, the estimated
coefficients of the first four dummies and the last four dummies.
15 The estimated coefficients γshort and .γmedium therefore need to be interpreted as the total merger effect
in the first and second year, respectively.
16 Formally, we substitute the short-term and medium-term effect dummies in equation (1) with one dummy
variable for each quarter that assumes the value of 1 only for the treated country in the relevant quarter.
We then compute the slope of a linear trend of the coefficients of these dummies in the pre-merger period
and test whether the estimated slope is statistically different from zero using the lincom command in Stata.
Our test is similar to the one proposed by Ashenfelter et al. (2013) and to the one discussed by Angrist and
Pischke (2008). This test is “passed” when we are not able to reject the null-hypothesis. This however only
provides some indication that a common trend may exist pre-merger, in particular because there are only a
few pre-merger observations.
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However, assuming that diverging trends will continue in the post-intervention
periods may not be appropriate, as often trends converge in the long run. In that case,
allowing for (linear) country specific trends may even result in more biased estimates
than the standard DiD estimator (see O’Neill et al. 2016). Testing the common trend
hypothesis and including country specific trends is also sensitive to the number of
pre-treatment periods, with results improving in the number of pre-treatment periods.
As we only have four to eight pre-merger observations, testing the common trend
hypothesis or including a country specific trend can be problematic. Which of the two
assumptions (common trend or country specific trend) is more appropriate depends
on the specific context but is generally difficult to assess as the merger affects the
price development post-merger. Given that both the graphical and statistical analyses
show that, in some instances, the common trend assumption is not met pre-merger we
present and discuss the results of both specifications. However, also the results of the
specification with country specific trends need to be interpreted with caution.17
Bertrand et al. (2004) showed that not taking into account existing autocorrela-
tion can lead to underestimated standard errors and therefore the erroneous finding
of statistically significant results. Therefore, we account for autocorrelation and het-
eroscedasticity in the residuals by using a cluster-robust estimator with clustering at
the country level. This allows the error terms to be correlated within a country and
over time, but not across countries. However, the small sample of available countries
(and, therefore, clusters) likely still results in a downward bias in the standard errors,
and, in turn, somewhat spuriously increases the statistical significance of the merger
effects estimated by the models (Wooldridge 2003).
One way to correct for this bias is to increase the number of clusters by, for example,
clustering at MNO-country level. This, however, would assume that the error terms
are not correlated across the MNOs of the same country, which we believe is an unrea-
sonable assumption. Another way suggested by the literature to correct for the bias of
low number of clusters is to compute standard errors using the wild bootstrap method
introduced by Cameron et al. (2008). However, the findings of the wild bootstrap tend
to underestimate the significance level of the estimates in case of a strong imbalance
in the number of treated units relative to the number of control units, and particularly
in case of only one treated unit and few control units, as in our setting (see Brewer
et al. 2013; MacKinnon and Webb 2014). This suggests that the true significance
level is likely to be somewhere in between the cluster-robust and the wild bootstrap
corrections.18
17 As an illustration, consider the price series for the High basket in the Netherlands shown in Fig. 2. If
one estimates a linear trend for the control group on the four pre-merger observations and extrapolates it to
the post-merger period, the price becomes almost the same as the price for the Mid basket. In this case, the
group specific trend may overcompensate the difference. Testing a non linear relation becomes difficult as
we only have four pre-merger observations.
18 Indeed, based on the wild bootstrap method we found p values in excess of 0.1 and much higher than
those computed with clustered standard errors. In the following tables, we report the significance of our
point estimates based on cluster-robust standard errors, as this is a standard approach which is commonly
used in the applied literature.
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The econometric specifications in the Netherlands have to be adapted to a number
of specificities of the T-Mobile/Orange merger.
First, we cannot exclude that some effects linked to the T-Mobile/Orange merger
may have already materialized before the merger was cleared in August 2007. By
February 2007 it became public knowledge that France Telecom, which owned Orange
Netherlands, was considering the sale of its Dutch subsidiary. Also in February, it was
reported that Orange Netherlands had attracted interest from several potential bid-
ders, among which T-Mobile and Vodafone were mentioned. In May 2007, Deutsche
Telekom, the mother company of T-Mobile, was reported to have effectively agreed to
acquire Orange Netherlands. The MNOs in the Netherlands may have already antici-
pated the merger in Q2/2007. It is conceivable that once a deal is expected to be struck,
this may already affect the pricing of the market participants, even if the merger is not
yet formally cleared or closed. For these reasons, we took a conservative approach and
excluded from the analysis the two periods Q2/2007 and Q3/2007 in our specification.
Second, the T-Mobile/Orange merger took place roughly two years after the
KPN/Telfort merger, which was cleared in August 2005. The KPN/Telfort merger
may have affected in particular the pre-merger trend of the T-Mobile/Orange merger.
Indeed, we observe that there was a divergence in the trend in the Netherlands and
the trend of the control countries in particular in the two quarters following the
KPN/Telfort merger. This led us to restrict the pre-merger period when assessing
the T-Mobile/Orange merger to four quarters, from Q2/2006 to Q1/2007, while we
kept the length of the post-merger period to eight quarters, from Q4/2007 to Q3/2009.
The shorter pre-merger period, however, may affect the precision of our estimates, as
we have a lower number of observations to disentangle the effect of the merger from
the impact of other explanatory variables.
Third, the competitor KPN used a multi-brand strategy (that is, it offered tariffs
under several brand names) throughout the analysed period. After the KPN/Telfort
merger, KPN kept the Telfort brand in the market, positioning Telfort as a relatively
cheaper brand. We cannot include these second brands in our analysis as second brands
were not included in the Teligen dataset (which is used for the control countries) until
2006 and the timing as of when sub-brands were included in the Teligen dataset differs
across countries. Therefore, second brands (including the Telfort brand of KPN) were
excluded from the analysis.
4 Results
Figure 2 compares the evolution of the average of the mobile prices of the four cheapest
tariffs of each of the MNOs in Austria (Panel a) and the Netherlands (Panel b) and the
average mobile price in all the control countries for the three baskets in the period from
Q2/2004 to Q2/2008 and Q1/2005 to Q3/2009 respectively. The vertical line in Panel a
indicates the quarter of the T-Mobile/tele.ring merger in Q2/2006 and the two vertical
lines in Panel b indicate the quarters of the two mergers in the Netherlands’ mobile
telecom market during the period considered: the KPN/Telfort merger in Q3/2005,
and the T-Mobile/Orange in Q3/2007.
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Fig. 2 Price developments in the treated versus the control countries
4.1 Main Results
Table 5 presents the results for the Low, Mid basket and High baskets in Austria. In
columns 1, 3 and 5, the results for the base specification are presented and in columns 2,
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Table 5 Estimation of merger effect Austria—four cheapest tariffs
Dep. variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
basket Log price Log price Log price Log price Log price Log price
Low Low Mid Mid High High
Short-term effect −0.231*** −0.019 −0.134*** −0.056 −0.074 −0.104*
(0.036) (0.055) (0.042) (0.058) (0.045) (0.058)
Medium-term effect −0.340*** 0.005 −0.180** −0.057 −0.128 −0.177*
(0.052) (0.096) (0.071) (0.102) (0.074) (0.095)
GDP growth 1.562 1.351 0.906 1.282 1.114 1.433
(1.296) (1.107) (1.500) (1.203) (1.482) (1.308)
Log MTR 0.007 0.128 0.098 0.120 0.130 0.125
(0.135) (0.118) (0.167) (0.084) (0.172) (0.081)
Observations 1727 1727 1727 1727 1727 1727
R2 0.737 0.754 0.815 0.841 0.832 0.865
Country-spec. trend No Yes No Yes No Yes
Common trend test (p val) 0.014 – 0.261 – 0.674 –
Cluster-robust SE below coefficients (SE clustered at country level)
Time fixed effects and country-MNO fixed-effects
Period: Q2/2004–Q2/2008; 8 quarters pre- and 8 quarters post-merger; Q2/2006 is dropped (merger quarter)
Common trend test—null hypothesis of common trend
Significance level: ***1, **5, *10%
4, and 6 the country-specific specific trend is included. In the Low basket, the common
trend test fails.
The T-Mobile/tele.ring merger was modified by commitments. Since our ex-post
evaluation does not allow separating the effects of the unmodified merger and of the
remedies, the presented results refer to the effects of the merger including the remedies.
For all baskets in Austria and both specifications, the results indicate that the merger
is associated with a drop in prices compared to the counterfactual of no merger, except
for the Low basket specification with the trend included. Moreover, the estimated
price reductions seem to grow over time, as the medium-term effects are usually
larger (more negative) than the short-term effects. In model (1), we estimate a price
reduction of 23% in the short term and of 34% in the medium term. Both estimates are
statistically significant when we use the cluster robust standard errors with clusters at
the country level. However, for this specification we reject the hypothesis that Austria
and the control countries share a common pre-merger trend (“common trend test”). In
model (2) with the country specific trend, the results become not significant anymore.
Looking at Fig. 2, the pre-merger trend in the control group is not continued in the
period post-merger. The Mid and High baskets specifications pass the common trend
test in the sense that the null-hypothesis of a common trend is not rejected at a 5%
confidence level. For the Mid basket we estimate a price reduction of 13% in the short
term and of 18% in the medium term (both statistically significant). The estimated price
reduction for the High basket is 7% in the short term and 13% in the medium term
(not statistically significant). For the Mid and High baskets with the country specific
trend included, we do observe some differences relative to the estimates without, but
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Table 6 Estimation of merger effect the Netherlands—four cheapest tariffs
Dep. variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
basket Log price Log price Log price Log price Log price Log price
Low Low Mid Mid High High
Short-term effect 0.062 0.148** 0.093** 0.126** 0.133*** 0.050
(0.049) (0.052) (0.035) (0.053) (0.021) (0.036)
Medium-term effect 0.009 0.141* 0.099** 0.149 0.167*** 0.030
(0.050) (0.070) (0.042) (0.084) (0.036) (0.063)
GDP growth 2.598** 1.315** 1.964** 0.980* 1.825** 0.806*
(0.889) (0.581) (0.765) (0.456) (0.644) (0.384)
Log MTR 0.015 −0.032 −0.032 −0.036 −0.083 −0.029
(0.126) (0.065) (0.088) (0.037) (0.065) (0.059)
Observations 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318
R2 0.707 0.727 0.785 0.806 0.825 0.842
Country-spec. trend No Yes No Yes No Yes
Common trend test (p val) 0.039 − 0.410 – 0.005 −
Cluster-robust SE below coefficients (SE clustered at country level)
Time fixed effects and country-MNO fixed-effects
Period: Q2/2005–Q3/2009; 4 quarters pre- and 8 quarters post-merger; Q2-Q3/2007 excluded quarters
(merger quarters)
Common trend test—null hypothesis of common trend
Significance level: ***1, **5, *10%
in both cases the estimated effects remain negative. For the High basket, the effects
become significant. Overall these results indicate that the price development in Austria
post-merger is not associated with relative price increases.
Finally both the coefficients associated to MTR and GDP are always positive,
suggesting (as expected) a positive relation between mobile prices and each of these
measures, however, the effects are not statistically significant.
Table 6 presents the results of our model corresponding to Eq. (1), for the Low,
Mid and High baskets in the Netherlands. In columns 1, 3 and 5, the results of the
base specification are presented and in columns 2, 4, and 6 the country specific trend
is included.
Looking at the results in Table 6, in all specifications the Dutch merger is associated
with an increase in prices. The increase in price is positive but not significant for the
Low basket in column (1), and increases and becomes significant when the trend is
included, see column (2). The price increase for the Mid basket is around 9% or more.
For the High basket the price increase attains 13–17% for the base specification but
the increase becomes insignificant when the trend is included.
As mentioned above, the KPN/Telfort merger may have resulted in price changes
especially in the two years after that merger. To the extent the prices were increasing
from Q2/2006 to Q1/2007 due to the KPN/Telfort merger, the estimated effect of the
T-Mobile/Orange merger may be biased upwards for the base specification. Based
on Fig. 2 as regards the Low and Mid baskets, the prices in the Netherlands did not
markedly increase during Q2/2006 to Q1/2007 relative to the control countries, which
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Table 7 Estimation of merger effect Austria—four cheapest tariffs, pre-paid only
Dep. variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
basket Log price Log price Log price Log price Log price Log price
Low Low Mid Mid High High
Short-term effect −0.380*** −0.116* −0.357*** −0.069 −0.348*** −0.061
(0.054) (0.061) (0.082) (0.082) (0.086) (0.087)
Medium-term effect − 0.502∗∗∗ − 0.075 − 0.445∗∗∗ 0.018 − 0.426 ∗ ∗ 0.037
(0.085) (0.107) (0.132) (0.143) (0.144) (0.155)
GDP growth 0.313 1.596 − 0.150 1.926 − 0.568 2.296
(0.824) (1.086) (1.189) (1.191) (1.411) (1.291)
Log MTR − 0.096 0.082 − 0.049 0.157 0.020 0.198
(0.241) (0.175) (0.358) (0.200) (0.371) (0.188)
Observations 1148 1148 1148 1148 1148 1148
R2 0.756 0.781 0.722 0.767 0.712 0.762
Country-spec. Trend No Yes No Yes No Yes
Common trend test (p val) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cluster-robust SE below coefficients (SE clustered at country level)
Time fixed effects and country-MNO fixed-effects
Period: Q2/2004–Q2/2008; 8 quarters pre- and 8 quarters post-merger; Q2/2006 is dropped (merger quarter)
Common trend test—null hypothesis of common trend
Significance level: ***1%, **5%, *10%
indicates the absence of significant (persistent) late effects of the KPN/Telfort merger.
However, as regards the High basket, the prices in the Netherlands increased during
Q2/2006 to Q1/2007 relative to the control countries. For this reason there is some
risk, especially for the High basket, that some of the estimated price increase may not
be causally linked to the T-Mobile/Orange merger. Formally, the common trend test
for the Low and High baskets is not passed which may reflect medium-term effects of
the earlier KPN/Telfort merger. In any event, the reliability of the trend specification
applied to the Dutch case may suffer from the very short pre-merger period (4 quarters)
and the effects of the KPN/Telfort merger.19
We observe that the time varying control variables (MTRs and GDP) in some cases
do not fully explain the observed differences in the pre-merger price trends across
countries. This is also reflected in our test for a common trend which in some instances
indicates diverging trends pre-merger.
4.2 Robustness Tests
Our first robustness test excludes all post-paid tariffs and runs the analysis only on the
pre-paid tariffs. As pre-paid tariff plans usually do not include a valuable subsidized
handset, this somewhat addresses the issue of handset subsidies, which are not recorded
19 We cannot exclude that in the absence of the KPN/Telfort merger there would have been a steeper price
decrease in Q2/2006 to Q1/2007, which would have likely implied higher estimated price effects of the
T-Mobile/Orange merger in the specification with country specific trends.
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Table 8 Estimation of merger effect the Netherlands—four cheapest tariffs, pre-paid only
Dep. variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
basket Log price Log price Log price Log price Log price Log price
Low Low Mid Mid High High
Short-term effect 0.094∗ 0.155 0.131∗∗∗ 0.128 0.150∗∗∗ 0.096
(0.045) (0.093) (0.041) (0.082) (0.047) (0.062)
Medium-term effect 0.077 0.183 0.149∗ 0.152 0.188∗ 0.107
(0.083) (0.162) (0.081) (0.155) (0.090) (0.124)
GDP growth 3.945∗∗∗ 1.364 3.547∗∗∗ 0.925 3.316∗∗ 0.937
(1.055) (0.905) (1.159) (0.870) (1.398) (0.791)
Log MTR 0.061 0.032 0.015 0.076 −0.026 0.049
(0.170) (0.226) (0.133) (0.138) (0.129) (0.069)
Observations 897 897 897 897 897 897
R2 0.676 0.717 0.714 0.753 0.730 0.772
Country-spec. Trend No Yes No Yes No Yes
Common trend test (p val) 0.370 – 0.888 – 0.276 –
Cluster-robust SE below coefficients (SE clustered at country level)
Time fixed effects and country-MNO fixed-effects
Period: Q2/2005–Q3/2009; 4 quarters pre- and 8 quarters post-merger; Q2-Q3/2007 excluded quarters
(merger quarters)
Common trend test—null hypothesis of common trend
Significance level: ***1%, **5%, *10%
separately in any of the datasets we have and therefore may bias our results.20 In
Table 7, the results for Austria are presented. For all baskets, the common trend test is
failed. In the specification without the country specific trend, we estimate even stronger
price reductions for all baskets, ranging from a 35 to 50% price decrease than in our
base model. In this specification, also the effects for the High basket are significant.
However, if the common trend is included, the price decreases become much smaller
and even positive for the medium-term for the Mid and High basket. Most coefficients
are however not significant.
For the Netherlands, the common trend test is passed for all three baskets (see
Table 8). The effects are in line with main analysis indicating a price increase of 9–
19%. Also the short-term effect for the Low basket becomes significant at the 10%
level. If the country specific trend is included, the price effects have more or less the
same magnitude, but are not significant.
As a further robustness check, we estimate our price measure only on the basis of
the two cheapest tariffs. Also in the specification without the country specific trend, we
obtain results that are largely comparable to the main estimates. In Austria, the effects
for the High basket become significant at the 10% level (see Table 9). Overall, under the
assumption that absent the merger the price trend in Austria would have followed the
trend of the control countries (after accounting for MTRs and GDP-growth), the results
20 For instance if handset subsidies changed in Austria or the Netherlands as a result of the merger but not
in the control group countries.
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Table 9 Estimation of merger effect Austria—two cheapest tariffs
Dep. variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
basket Log price Log price Log price Log price Log price Log price
Low Low Mid Mid High High
Short-term effect − 0.302∗∗∗ 0.006 − 0.124∗∗ 0.014 − 0.104∗∗ −0.112
(0.033) (0.056) (0.040) (0.07) (0.042) (0.07)
Medium-term effect − 0.358∗∗∗ 0.149 −0.134 0.091 − 0.146∗ −0.159
(0.057) (0.1) (0.077) (0.124) (0.075) (0.116)
GDP growth 0.652 1.321 −0.344 1.010 0.265 1.039
(1.238) (1.135) (1.483) (1.230) (1.447) (1.292)
Log MTR −0.020 0.177 0.107 0.151 0.159 0.145*
(0.144) (0.139) (0.169) (0.099) (0.164) (0.073)
Observations 864 864 864 864 864 864
R2 0.814 0.833 0.862 0.890 0.874 0.904
Country-spec. trend No Yes No Yes No Yes
Common trend test (p val) 0.001 0.085 0.972
Cluster-robust SE below coefficients (SE clustered at country level)
Time fixed effects and country-MNO fixed-effects
Period: Q2/2004–Q2/2008; 8 quarters pre- and 8 quarters post-merger; Q2/2006 is dropped (merger quarter)
Common trend test—null hypothesis of common trend
Significance level: ***1%, **5%, *10%
suggest relatively strong price reductions associated with the merger with estimates
of price reductions ranging from 10 to 35%.
However, the trend test is not passed for the Low and Mid basket. If we include
the country-specific trends, the effects for the Low and Mid basket become positive,
although not significant.
For the Netherlands, the results are presented in Table 10. In contrast to the main
specification, the common trend test is passed for all baskets in the Netherlands. The
estimated effect is similar to that of the main specification for the Low basket. The
effects are slightly stronger with significant price increases of 12–18% for the Mid
and High basket. If the trend is included, the effects remain positive but are significant
less often. Overall, there are indications that a price increase is associated with the
T-Mobile/Orange merger (relative to the scenario absent the merger).
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In Austria, for (almost) all specifications we estimate negative price effects associated
with the remedied merger. The estimates that we consider more reliable range from
−2% up to −20%, both in the short term and in the medium term. In light of these
results it appears very unlikely that the merger resulted in (significant) price increase
relative to the scenario in the absence of the merger. Importantly, we can only estimate
the effects of the mergers as modified by commitments. In Austria, the structural com-
mitments offered by the merging parties are likely to have strengthened the smallest
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Table 10 Estimation of merger effect Netherlands—two cheapest tariffs
Dep. variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
basket Log price Log price Log price Log price Log price Log price
Low Low Mid Mid High High
Short-term effect 0.073 0.151∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.118 0.125∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗
(0.054) (0.078) (0.042) (0.086) (0.027) (0.044)
Medium-term effect 0.027 0.151 0.134∗ 0.131 0.182∗∗∗ 0.138
(0.075) (0.121) (0.064) (0.142) (0.058) (0.083)
GDP growth 2.296∗∗ 0.834 1.677∗ 0.837 1.459 0.546
(0.967) (0.485) (0.923) (0.506) (0.885) (0.560)
Log MTR 0.037 0.051 − 0.03 − 0.001 − 0.083 − 0.022
(0.140) (0.086) (0.102) (0.051) (0.091) (0.068)
Observations 660 660 660 660 660 660
R2 0.817 0.861 0.852 0.896 0.864 0.900
Country-spec. trend No Yes No Yes No Yes
Common trend test (p val) 0.174 - 0.929 - 0.416 -
Cluster-robust SE below coefficients (SE clustered at country level)
Time fixed effects and country-MNO fixed-effects
Period: Q2/2005–Q3/2009; 4 quarters pre- and 8 quarters post-merger; Q2-Q3/2007 excluded quarters
(merger quarters)
Common trend test—null hypothesis of common trend
Significance level: ***1, **5, *10%
two operators (Orange and especially Hutchinson), as market developments after the
merger appear to show.
Whilst after the T-Mobile/Orange merger prices in Netherlands did not increase in
absolute terms, the prices increased relative to the estimated prices in the absence of the
merger. The price increases appear to be more pronounced for heavier users of mobile
services, with estimated price increases in the range between 10 and 15%. However,
it is difficult to attribute these price increases firmly to the T-Mobile/Orange merger
in light of possible confounding effects of the earlier KPN/Telfort merger as well as
further specificities of the Dutch analysis. Nevertheless, the T-Mobile/Orange merger,
possibly together with the KPN/Telfort merger, may have led to price increases. In light
of these results, it would be interesting to revisit the argument whether a vibrant MVNO
segment pre-merger can be expected to impose a sufficient competitive constraint post-
merger. This could be for example done by studying how wholesale terms developed
compared to the retail terms.
These results suggest that merger effects of mobile telecom mergers appear to
be driven by characteristics of the respective markets and the merging parties (such
as the degree of competitive interaction between the merging MNOs) as well as by
commitments that were offered to obtain competition clearance. Indeed, the two anal-
ysed mergers differed significantly. For example, at the time the Austrian merger was
announced, there were five competing MNOs whereas in the Netherlands there were
only four competing MNOs pre-merger. Moreover, the price decreases observed in
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Austria may reflect that competing MNOs were strengthened by means of the imposed
remedies.
The relatively low precision of the estimated price effects is not surprising, as we
have a relatively small sample of control countries that we compare to only a single
affected country. Hence, we are not able to separate the merger effects from idiosyn-
cratic post-merger price dynamics in Austria or the Netherlands, respectively, and we
cannot exclude that idiosyncratic price developments in some of the control countries
are affecting the results. In this respect, in the Netherlands, the presence of a relatively
large MVNO segment might result in somewhat different competition dynamics than
in other countries where there is no sizable MVNO segment. More generally, prices
in all countries appear to be substantially affected over time by idiosyncratic effects.
One important consideration for the interpretation of ex-post evaluations of merg-
ers is the role of merger control. As illustrated by the analysis of the Austrian
T-Mobile/tele.ring merger, often only the effect of the merger as modified by com-
mitments can be estimated and the necessity of the commitments cannot be studied.21
However, if a remedied merger still entails significant anti-competitive effects, this
indicates that the remedies were insufficient from an ex-post perspective.
As regards evaluation of mobile telecom mergers we see in particular two avenues
for future research. First, it would be important to study also implications of mobile
telecom mergers on mobile network quality. If sufficient data on network quality
are available, similar techniques could be applied to study the effect of mergers on
network quality. However, as mobile telecom investments usually require a lead time
of several years, the analysed period probably needs to be extended, which in turn may
exacerbate the above-mentioned issues of dealing with idiosyncratic effects. Second,
as the number of mobile mergers increases over time, additional insights can be gained
from broad econometric studies on the determinants of mobile telecom merger effects,
such as Genakos et al. (2015).
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